The paper analyses the underpinning factors of foreign direct investments towards the MENA countries. Our main interpretative hypothesis is based on the significant role of the quality of institutions to attract FDI. In MENA experience the growth of FDI flows proved to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU or in Asian economies, such as China and India. Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance: i) the small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration; ii) the changes in the scenario of international competition; iii) economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly insufficient. Using the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) governance indicators, we examine the role of "institutional quality" on FDI trough a regression analysis. Our analysis show as institutions play an important role in the relative performances of countries in attracting FDI. At last, data on institutional quality and business climate show the relative disvantages of MENA. Our paper suggests as MENA countries require deep institutional reforms in order to improve the attractiveness in terms of FDI. . The present work is the result of a common reflection; nonetheless, sections 1, 2.1 and 4 can be attributed to Ugo Marani, sections.2.2. and 3 to Vittorio Daniele. The authors would like to thank Massimo Aria for some useful suggestions.
Introduction
Since the early nineties, economists have been paying a growing attention to the relationship between institutions and economic growth. Several studies show as "good institutions" can encourage private investments, improve the overall efficiency of the economic system and significantly contribute to the economic growth in the long run 1 .
Along this strand of research, some studies have also been aimed at analysing the relationships between national institutional systems and the countries' ability to attract foreign direct investments (FDI). The works of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) , Stern (2003) , Bénassy-Queré, et all. (2005) are some recent examples in this research field. These works have shown that, especially in developing countries and emerging economies, the quality of institutions and of the regulatory system operating in the economy, has a significant impact over inward FDI.
Starting from a survey of the results obtained from existing literature, this paper explores FDI inflows in the MENA 2 , dwelling upon the features of their institutional systems.
The analysis of MENA institutional systems appears to be particularly interesting. In the last decade, in fact, most of these countries has undergone profound economic and institutional reforms, aimed at improving macroeconomic stability, international openness and the development of the private sector. The signing of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement, along with a progressive elimination of trade barriers, have positively affected international trade relations in the area.
However, high import tariffs and significant non-tariff barriers (especially those related to the bureaucratic and institutional machinery) still in existence, make the 1 By institutions in a broad sense, we mean the whole of the regulations, both formal and informal, as well as the framework of those incentives which shape individual behaviours. Institutions may be defined in a variety of ways, but we first need to distinguish between political and economic institutions. The former include the rules of "the game of politics", such as constitutional rules, election rules, limitations to the government activity and to other public bodies. The economic institutions may be regarded as the rules of "the game of economics", played by economic operators, such as individual property rights, commercial laws, regulations concerning licensing, credit, the setting up of business enterprises etc. For a definition cf. North (1990) . For the analysis of the role of institutions on economic growth cf. Hall and Jones (1999) , Acemoglu et all. (2004) , Eicher and Leukert (2006) . region one of the most protected in the world (European Commission, 2003) . In other words, more extensive reforms are needed if the area is to become internationally competitive, particularly with regard to emerging economies, such as those of southeastern Asian and Latin American countries (Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004) .
Over the last ten years, FDI have significantly increased both in absolute and relative terms. MENA countries' performance, however, appears to remain distinctly below that of many other developing economies or emerging countries. In particular, the growth of FDI flows prove to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU new members (EEC) 3 or in the big rapid growth Asian economies, such as China and India.
Some studies show that, in the MENA, FDI disincentives are related to the macroeconomic context of the area, to the delays in reform implementation, to the poor quality of the institutional system, as well as to the political and social risks which are specific to some of those countries.
In the following section, FDI trends in the MENA are compared with other economies, particularly with EEC. In the third section, the illustration of the growth performance and a general outline of MENA political and social background are followed by an empirical analysis of the relations between institutional variables and FDI. Some conclusive remarks make up the last section. 3 We refer to the ten countries joned at the EU in 2004, in particular to that of the Eastern Europe.
FDI in the MENA

FDI worldwide distribution
FDI increase is a major sign of globalization. Between 1980 and 2004, FDI flows in the world went from 55 to 648 billion dollars. The highest growth rate took place in the second half of the 90s; after which, the flows started decreasing. Rates recorded at the end of the period under consideration appear, however, to be distinctly above any previous ones. 
FDI in MENA
From 1990 on, FDI grew significantly in the MENA: the flows increased both in absolute value and in terms of the fixed gross investments of the region. Figure 2 shows the inflow trend in the MENA, in the 10 EEC countries and in China.
Remarkable differences can be noted among the three economies under consideration. As shown in Figure 3 , FDI flow growth promoted capital accumulation in many countries: between 1990 and 2004, FDI went from 5 to 13,5% of fixed gross investments in the MENA, from 10 to above 40% in the EU, from 10 to 12% in China. In Israel (the most developed country in the region), flows are similar to those arriving in Hungary; in Turkey, FDI values are in line with small-sized Slovakia; they remain considerably lower in the other countries. Figure 6 shows the data related to greenfield FDI projects. In the period under consideration (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , there was a significant increase in greenfield FDI in the MENA. In the three-year period, these countries were, as a whole, the recipient of 600 investment projects. Projects topped 2000 in the EEC, around 3900 in the EU and 4800 in China and India. Even in this case, MENA performance proves to be modest if compared to that of emerging or low income economies. These data are significant: the MENA region, in spite of low labour cost and its being so close to Europe, doesn't seem to be able to provide incentives for delocalization. It is also worth noting that greenfield investments (mainly taking place in the Maghribi region) only affect a few traditional sectors: textiles, tourism, cement manufacture etc. (Radwan and Reiffer, 2005) . In synthesis, research shows that there are at least three main reasons at the basis of this relatively low capacity of the MENA to attract investments:
1. The small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration inside the MENA. As we shall shortly see, the economic dimension of the MENA is relatively small, while trade integration among the southern countries (the Agadir agreements between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan) is not yet strong enough to enlarge the dimension of the potential market.
2. The second reason may be traced back to the changes in the scenario of international competition. Eastward EU expansion along with the rapid growth of some big economies in Latin America, China and India, have provided new opportunities for international investors. As we have already seen, EEC and China have received substantial FDI flows, particularly greenfield investments.
3. Thirdly, economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly insufficient, while restraint of investments along with the inadequacy of its institutional and legal framework only add to the low attractive capacity of the region (Alessandrini, 2000; Radwan and Reiffers, 2005) .
Do institutions matter for FDI?
Macroeconomic background
From an economical perspective, the MENA are relatively small countries.
The gross domestic product of the whole region equals 9% of the EU with 15 countries, just below that of Spain. Excepted for Israel, the MENA rank among the medium-low income countries. Per capita GDP in the region is, on average, 6,700 $ (PPP), that is 24% of the 15 European countries, with Syria hardly reaching 13%. The overall population is about 250 million inhabitants, more than half of which is concentrated in Egypt and Turkey (Table 2) . Table 3 shows the growth rates of aggregate and per capita GDP in the MENA, in the 15 EU countries, in China and India. After 1995, growth in the MENA slows down, going from 4,2 to 3,4%. Though remaining above that of the most developed European countries, it still is remarkably inferior to that recorded in the big emerging economies. The differences appear to be even more striking when we consider per capita growth. High birth rates in the MENA, in fact, result in a poor growth of per capita GDP, which equals about 1,3% yearly between 1995 and 2003. MENA average (left scale) and in percentage of UE15 1980 UE15 -2003 . Calculation on World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. In the last twenty years, per capita GDP (PPP, constant $ 2000) in the MENA has increased by 1,3 times, going from 4,900 to 6,250 $. In the same period, in the 15 EU countries, per capita GDP has increased by 1,7 times. The growth in the MENA, therefore, turns out to have been rather weak. As a result, the gap with the most advanced EU countries has increased: as shown in Figure 8 , per capita GDP in the MENA has gone from 31 to 24% of the average 15 EU countries. Figure 8 illustrates some results of the growth accounting exercise drawn from the work of Bosworth and Collins (2003) . Their data show that international differences in the growth of the product per employed are mainly explained by differences in the TFP (total factor productivity) growth. Even in this case, differences between the MENA and other economies appear to be striking. In the MENA, TFP growth has been, on average, relatively low and, for many countries, even negative.
TFP increase is very important: besides explaining the growth differentials, it also points out inefficiencies in the functioning of the economic system in most countries under consideration. We can also see that in industrial countries and emerging economies (China in particular), TFP accounts for a relevant share of the productivity growth. Source: Calculation on Bosworth and Collins (2003) .
With reference to the Arabian countries, Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2003) point out that low TFP growth shows ineffectiveness of investments due to three fundamental causes: social and political instability; excess of regulations and the presence of heavy public intervention discouraging private investments; poor quality of the human capital. As expected, these factors affect in the negative both domestic and (more even so) foreign investments.
From the late eighties on, many countries in the MENA started macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural adjustments 4 . These policies took different paths and their outcome was different, too. In general, the programs Source: Calculation on FMI, WEO, 2005. In Egypt and Lebanon, reforms were slower and less effective. In Egypt, the macroeconomic stabilization policies of the nineties were followed by the introduction of trade restrictions. In Algeria -where the repercussions of the oil price fall-off were particularly heavy -reforms were limited. In particular, the trade reforms which had been started in the early nineties, met with a standstill in 1998 and were taken up again in 2001, after the subscription of the Euro-Med agreements. Investment liberalization, which was started in 1991, has proved to be insufficient even in Syria. On the other hand, Syria and Algeria also have to face strong banking restrictions as well as a virtually total control by public banks. In all the countries, reforms resulted in a significant inflation decrease and in a greater macroeconomic stability. Adjustment policies and the Euro-Med agreements have led to a slow reduction of trade restrictions. In these countries, nevertheless, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers still remain very high. For example, in Morocco and Tunisia, the average tariff equals 33 and 30%, that is more than twice that of medium and low income countries. In Egypt, it equals 21%. Non-tariff barriers, though slowly decreasing, remain nevertheless significant. In Tunisia, import licences have been replaced by administrative barriers -cahier de charge; in Morocco, technical controls and quality standards put a curb on imports (World Bank, 2003b).
Instability and conflicts
Instability, social and political tensions, conflicts and the risks of terrorist attacks make up strong deterrents to foreign investments. The relevance of such risksparticularly involving the emerging and developing economies -has been proved both by empirical research and by the surveys which have been carried out by international investors (Brink, 2004; AT-Kearney, 2004) . During that period, some radical groups such as the Groupes Islamiques Armés (GIA) and the Armé Islamique de Salut (AIS) started to gain ground in the region. In 1995, president Zerual started a harsh repression which resulted in everincreasing violence. According to some estimates, the number of the dead topped 100.000. Other massacres followed in 1997, in 1998 and 2000. Table 5 is a brief taxonomy of non-violent (intensity 1 and 2) and violent conflicts (intensity 3 and 4) at work in the MENA area in 2005. There are several indicators for the political, economic and social risks and many of them are also related to the specific features of the national institutional systems (for a survey, see Brink, 2004) . Among the most widely used risk indicators is the one worked out by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS). Figure 9 points out a significant correlation between the PRS index and FDI inflows 5 .
The impact of political risk factors taken into consideration in the PRS index concerning FDI has been explored in the work of Busse and Hefeker (2005) . By means of a cross-country analysis over a 20-year period, Busse and Hefeker show that a government's stability, internal and external conflicts, as well as non-insurable risk components are basic determinants of FDI 6 . Not only do such phenomena cause a rise in investments risks, but they also tend to increase the volatility risk itself thus making investment planning very difficult. Chan and Gemayel (2004, p.14) illustrate the way this happens: the instability of risk indices provides a better fit than the indices themselves when explaining the ratio of FDI to GDP over time for MENA countries. 
The role of institutions
Since the early nineties, ample research has been aimed at exploring the role of institutions in economic growth. These studies show that effective enforcement of civil and property rights, economic freedom, a regulatory system which can stimulate private investments along with low corruption levels, never fail to bring about greater development and higher growth rates. The causal relationship between institutions and per capita GDP has been examined by some authors. What we really need to understand, in fact, is whether it is institutions that can favour development or whether, on the contrary, it is higher development standards which can stimulate the making of good institutions. The question is still a matter for debate. However, in the works of Hall and Jones (1999) , Acemoglu et all. (2004) , Kaufmann and Kraay (2003) , ample evidence is given to support the idea that it is institutions that can stimulate development rather than the other way round.
Alongside this strand of research, economists have been analyzing the relationships between institutions and FDI. These studies pinpoint the different ways in which institutions can affect FDI inflows. In the first place, the presence of good institutions tends to improve factor productivity thus stimulating investments;
secondly, good institutions cause a reduction in investment-related transaction costs (such as corruption-related costs); finally, since FDI, especially the greenfield type, involve high sunk costs, they are affected by the insecurity resulting from social and political instability, by the degree of enforcement of property rights and by the effectiveness of the legal system (Stern, 2003; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2001 ).
Among recent studies, Bénassy-Quéré et all. work (2005) The work of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) examines the connection between those variables which are indicative of the national institutional systems and FDI in 144 countries. Among other results, the work illustrates the way FDI are affected by institution standards. In particular, the authors come to the conclusion that "political governance matters, and improved political governance does not necessarily oblige governments to make large investments of taxpayers' money (…..) Indeed, improved governance might be more consistent, in many cases, with a smaller economic and regulatory role for governments. Improved political governance leads to increased inward FDI especially for smaller developing countries" (Globermann and Shapiro 2002:42) .
There are several indicators of the institutional efficiency. Box 1 summarizes the most widely used among them.
Box 1. Measuring institutional quality
• Index of Economic Freedom: This index is provided by Heritage Foundation for 161 countries. To measure economic freedom and rate each country, 50 independent variables have been considered. These variables fall into 10 categories of economic freedom. Each country receives its overall economic freedom score based on the simple average of the 10 individual factor score. Each factor is graded according to a unique scale. The scale runs from 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates an economic environment or a set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom; a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom. (2005) . These indicators cover the period 1996-2004 and six dimensions of governance: 1) voice and accountability -measuring political and civil rights; 2) political instability and violence: measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in government; 3) government effectiveness: measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; 4) regulatory burdenmeasuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies; 5) rule of law: measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; 6) control of corruptionmeasuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. The six governance indicators are measured into units ranging from about -2,5 to 2,5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. For the year 2005, this index was available for 209 countries and territories.
The majority of the literature on institutions and FDI focus on the institutions in the host country. The Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) database is particularly adapted to analyse the role of institutions, since it is based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 data sources constructed by 31 different organizations. Figure 10 show the correlation between four governance indicators and FDI inflows in 156 countries. The correlations appear to be relevant for each indicator. The regression output is presented in Table 6 . The estimation results were robust, with satisfactorily adjusted R 2 values. It is worth noting that all the variables indicating institutional quality are significant, with the exception of political instability. The signs obtained are, as expected, positive. It can also be noted that in the set of base variables taken into consideration, only per capita energetic consumption (approximating the level of economic development) turns out to be always significant. Fig. 11 displays the correlation circle between the variables and the FPC. It is possible to note as the correlation are all positives with the first factorial axis, with "political stability" the less correlated variable. 
Figure 11. Correlations circle variable-axes F1-F2 Factorial plane
We run a second regression including in the base equation the new variable "institutional efficiency". The regression's output is presented in Table 8 . The variable efficiency is significant (3,47) and the sign of the coefficient is positive. As expected, higher institutional efficiency has a positive impact on FDI. Figure 12 displays the factorial plan and the position of each country as regards the first principal component. Table 9 illustrates the rank of the MENA countries, for each governance indicators, in the international classification (209 countries). It is possible to see as in these countries are the quality of governance is in general very bad, except for Israel that obtain the best score for each governance indicator. From an empirical point of view, the impact of government regulation of business on FDI has been examined by Busse and Groizard (2006) . By means of five indicators contained in the Doing Business database, and by applying the analysis to a sample of 89 countries, Busse and Groizard prove that economies with high regulation standards (as measured through the indicators considered) draw comparatively less benefit from the presence of multinational firms. Their research supports the idea that international trade and foreign investments only stimulate growth in those countries which have "better" institutions and lower levels of business regulation.
The implications of this study are remarkable. As pointed out by the authors: "Any attempts by government to attract capital in the form of foreign direct investment by offering special tax breaks are not likely to yield the expected beneficial effects if the regulatory quality and liquidity of financial markets, host countries have to reform their fundamental framework for regulations to enhance chances that FDI inflows can contribute to higher growth rates" (Busse and Groizard, 2006:21) . Table 11 reports Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance:
• the small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration;
• the changes in the scenario of international competition;
• economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly insufficient;
• the instability of macroeconomic and political framework.
Secondly, we have examined the role of institutions on FDI, using the dataset developed by Kaufman and Kraay (2005) 
